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1. Forerunners of neuroethical debate
No more than 5 decades ago, bioethics formally took the stage as an independent 
discipline. Intended to normatively frame the rapidly growing knowledge of biologi-
cal function, the appearance of the discipline constituted a normative response 
to what was viewed as a morally agnostic and scientifically aseptic attitude to the 
investigative and utilitarian ends of biological research [1]. Inspired by a broader 
recognition of a science isolated from its “ought to do” dimension, highlighted in 
contemporaneous debates on nuclear power by such literary elites as Huxley [2], 
the biological emphasis sought to address a spectrum of concerns, from ecological 
destruction to biological weaponry and genetic engineering, among others. In coin-
ing the term bioethics, accordingly, Van Rensselaer Potter emphasized its scope as the 
“science of survival” that required the bridging of two cultures, one scientific and the 
other humanistic and moral. Given the historical context of the Cold War era, Van 
Rensselaer’s proposal resonated broadly in its public recognition, launching bioethics 
as a widely motivated and widely disciplined undertaking [3].
Nonetheless, and despite the persistent public engagement with issues of ecologi-
cal misuse and military use of biological capabilities, bioethics has since and relatively 
quickly come to be viewed as a normative extension of clinical practice. In the evolu-
tion introduced by the Dutch obstetrician Andre Hellegers, the object of bioethics 
was conceived as forging an ethical structure that would give intellectual scope to 
the ethical dimension already implicit in medical practice. In Hellegers’ scheme [4], 
the science of bioethics was to discover and compile values in a dialog that encircled 
medicine, philosophy, and ethics, which would take into account the ongoing stream 
of information emerging from biological discovery and medical technology.
As an intellectual stepchild of ethical practices surrounding the health care of 
the human being, bioethics is heir to a normative tradition extending to antiquity. 
Premised on the recognition of the unique value within each individual, medical 
care has traditionally been guided by principles meant to ensure the preservation of 
this recognition even in circumstances of significant health risk. While this histori-
cal legacy has clearly influenced the modern understanding of bioethics, its recent 
emergence as an independent discipline underscores its distinction from the former 
and raises questions regarding underlying factors that have driven the need for its 
emergence. Beyond issues of the rapidity and magnitude of information acquired at 
ever-grander scales—which must be adequately assimilated before any therapeutic 
intervention—emerging core ethical concerns have been especially influenced 
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by their contingency to philosophical conceptions that have become increasingly 
pluralistic. Among these are included an increasing power over the regulation of 
organismal performance; an evolving conception of intervention as a therapeutic 
undertaking; supraphysical notions of organismal, organizational reality; and 
ontological and anthropological conceptions of the physical basis of human nature. 
A recurring theme raised by ever-greater knowledge and technical prowess over 
organismal regulation, for example, is the manipulation by and interaction with 
technological devices that bear not only on limiting their use but also on the very 
nature of technology and its relation to the human being. New interventional notions 
thus not only need to include the traditional principles of malfeasance, benefi-
cence, autonomy, and justice but must also incorporate what is meant by health and 
disease, normality and deviance. Crucially, across a wide swath of the physical sci-
ences, fundamental questions on the nature of physical reality are assuming greater 
prominence as the recognition of the insufficiency of compositional approaches, 
which have dominated scientific exploration since Descartes and Newton, impels 
the consideration of a more synthetic understanding of material reality, like that 
of entities and their relation to properties. Finally, and critically for the ethics of 
applied neuroscience, are ontological and anthropological concerns related to human 
subjectivity and its relation to the objective reality of his corporal presence in the 
world, concerns that have become especially acute since Heideggerian revisions of 
metaphysical understanding [5].
Accordingly, bioethics and medical ethics remain the scholarly objects of a philo-
sophical tension introduced and exacerbated by the restless expansion of biological 
knowledge. This tension originates in the need to appropriate a philosophical con-
ception of physical reality that can then be normatively evaluated. However, with 
the assimilation of pluralistic notions on the physical reality of the body—which is 
the direct object of medical or biological intervention—normative principles and 
ethical praxis themselves remain varied. That is, while ethical praxis is contingent 
on some action taken toward the corpus, such praxis acquires normative signifi-
cance only within a conceptual framework of the contingent material reality.
The effect on ethical praxis of assimilating the current conceptual ambiguity 
is most acute in issues concerned with neural intervention. Indeed, ontological 
and anthropological tensions uniquely characterize neuro(bio)ethics as a norma-
tive discipline, which must confront concerns over the impact of intervention on 
global and organismal regulations, conceptually addressed in philosophy of science 
accounts. The uncertainty between how the individual is understood and the physi-
cal features inherent in the neural activity of the brain that enable the expression of 
these human features has marked the field, particularly in its development of meta-
ethical principles that correspondingly evolve neuroethical praxis [6, 7]. This text, 
especially, proposes just such an illustration of the current ambiguity. Accordingly, 
the following discussion will seek to address this ambiguity by grounding the philo-
sophical accounts in fundamental features of natural reality, articulated through 
the metaphysical understanding of the ontological subject. This grounding then 
engages a dialectic with the issues of praxis presented in subsequent chapters.
2.  Appropriating a philosophical conception of disease for 
neurobioethics
2.1 Functionalism
The absence of a reconciliation between philosophical conceptions of physical 
reality and the neural activity of the brain suggest that interventional praxis may 
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best be related to medical notions of normality and disease that entail empirically 
accessible parameters. Neurological impairment, especially, is a significant domain 
of research, with an expanding fund of knowledge on the etiology of various cogni-
tive diseases. Accordingly, in the absence of philosophical reconciliation, viewing 
neural intervention by the yardstick of disease replication offers a pragmatic means 
of arriving at normative conclusions.
Implicit in the appropriation of a disease model, nonetheless, is a conceptual 
interpretation of the disease state, with its understanding of normality and devia-
tion. According to this conception, attributions about disease etiology frequently 
view disease as malfunction [8] and well being as a commonly observed biological 
order. Such functionalist notions derive their sense from what is understood of 
the role of a component system in “normal” operation, where disease etiologies 
reflect the component system’s incapacity to function according to biologically 
ascertained standards. Normality and variance are therefore set in the context of 
the malfunctioning of a component’s operation, for example, a cardiovascular 
or retinal lesion where affected anatomical and physiological zones are clearly 
demarcated.
According to this epistemological approach, a disease is conceived as having 
a causal origin affecting a specific anatomical or functional domain and generat-
ing one or more symptomatic features indicative of the disease state. Hepatitis, 
for example, is “caused” by the hepatitis virus, which localizes to the liver, 
where it displays symptoms of fibrosis. Disease states are understood to bridge 
two domains, one involving empirical judgments about human physiology and 
another concerned with normative judgments about human well-being [9]. Stated 
otherwise, notions of normality are articulated through the window of empirical 
assessment, which is used to delimit functional adequacy. Such judgments thus 
evoke definitions of normality and deviation that are locally applied to the affected 
zone. Normative judgments, on the other hand, must be elicited on the empirical 
judgments to ascertain whether these constitute circumstances that are undesirable 
or that diminish the capacity for flourishing. Normative conclusions, accord-
ingly, constitute value judgments that are meted out with respect to an objectively 
accepted value standard for an empirically circumscribed zone. In adopting an 
analogous approach to the neurobioethics of interventions, there is thus appropri-
ated an empirical methodology used to delimit the range of processes for which 
normative conclusions may be drawn.
In a Boorsian [8] conception of disease as malfunction, notably, disease features 
are highly territorialized in their causal structure and zone of influence. Value 
judgments that are contingent to such narrowly defined empirical assessments, 
therefore, are restricted to normative judgments on physiological normality, that 
is, they are primarily conditioned by the normative valuation given to attributions 
of functional adequacy. In bodily domains outside the nervous system, such as the 
liver, and even in some brain-based regions such as stroke-related lesions, this value 
attribution is essentially valid. However, its invocation for many other cognitive 
diseases, perhaps most, must confront an intrinsic, global regulatory role of the 
nervous system that is required to regulate organismal properties that define the 
individual’s ontological features.
Accordingly, normative judgments that are narrowly defined by a functional-
ist interpretation of the disease state, and the ethical praxis that devolves from 
this understanding, are insufficient for evolving metaethical principles suited to 
cognitive intervention. Functionalist approaches to cognitive diseases thus lend 
themselves with difficulty to the elaboration of a comprehensive, neurobioethi-
cal praxis, due to the broader organismal role with which the nervous system is 
associated.
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2.2 Cognitive disease and organismal unity
This broader role pertains, minimally, to capacities for unifying organismal 
operation and goal orientation, that is, integral and teleological features intrinsic 
to the ontological status of the organisms as a whole. Indeed the widespread 
recognition of the unique and irreplaceable role of the nervous system in mediat-
ing organismal unity has constituted an empirical pillar for philosophical concep-
tions of bodily integration that underwrite clinical ethics in death determinations 
[10]. As a fundamental capacity for goal seeking, integration is crucial to human 
flourishing. Hence, impairing these mechanisms can be expected to diminish this 
capacity and so evoke normative concern. Cognitive diseases, as mentioned, are 
especially prone to impairments of these mechanisms, and interventions repro-
ducing effects of the cognitive disease states, either whole or in part, are likely to 
deleteriously influence them. Accordingly, they are likely to be physical conditions 
that would be ethically probative.
This is manifestly evident in the limiting case of bodily death, life being predi-
cated on the body’s organismal integration. With death, mechanisms of integration 
are no longer operative, and organismal unity is thereby destroyed. As a conceptual 
position universally recognized across religious, cultural, and secular scholarship 
[11], the loss of all organismal unity constitutes a probative, ethical imperative of 
ultimate and universal significance. This is also to say that while the events of death 
and the organismal mechanisms that work to unify the organism are physically 
instantiated, it is in view of the conceptual validity of organismal unity that the 
normative imperative is validated. By extension, factors that diminish but do not 
wholly void bodily integration also lessen individual well-being. A reduced capacity 
for intentional self-action, that is, a hallmark of several widely prevalent cogni-
tive diseases, for example, diminishes autonomy and the satisfaction of individual 
need. Disturbances of self, for instance, traditionally mark the diagnostic evalua-
tion of the schizophrenia patient [12], seen in an abnormal sense of ownership of 
the body, loss of ego boundary, and confused sense of self-agency. Such reduced 
phenomenological capacities have been shown to have their counterpart in physical 
features of cognition. Imaging modalities reveal, for example, a consistently high 
correspondence between fMRI modules and those of diffusion imaging in normal 
individuals, whereas those from schizophrenia patients exhibit both decreases in 
overall modularity and in correspondence of networks [13]. These diseases illustrate 
that not only the absence but also the partial impairment of physical processes for 
organismal integration significantly impact individual flourishing.
Taken together, meta-principles premised on disease and notions of malfunction 
have a practical but restricted role for evolving neuroethical praxis in the absence of 
philosophical judgments on global, physical attributes of the individual, of which 
the integrative and unitive dimension is paramount.
3. The organismal dimension of neurobioethics
3.1 Metaphysical contingency of the neural architecture
Normative conclusions that relate to a global organizational order, on the other 
hand, resemble ethical approaches that generalize to the individual as a whole, that 
is, not as an epistemological abstraction only but as a metaphysical conclusion on 
the natural reality of the individual, who is epistemically evident. These approaches 
thus distinguish themselves from those that define the human being functionally 
and that emphasize properties to the exclusion of their source, like that premised 
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on the “stream of consciousness” [7] or that of delocalized essence, like extended 
mind theory [6]. They are thus also distinguished from an ethical pragmatism that 
is contingent to notions of disease as malfunction.
Such holistic routes to metaethics typically value the individual as a normative 
locus that is operative in the world. By virtue of an intrinsic metaphysical unity, 
they then extend value contingency to the whole of the individual. Neo-Thomistic 
developments in the twentieth century, like that of Etienne Gilson [14], for exam-
ple, draw normative value from metaphysical conclusions, prioritizing the notion of 
presence as action in philosophies of being. Karol Wojtyla’s metaphysical approach 
to ethics [15], for instance, anchors the personalist dimension of intentionalized 
action in the unitary reality of the whole individual. As a metaethical principle, this 
dimension appeals to a dual normative contingency present within the individual. 
The personalist subject is considered, first, as an agent of ethical activity and, 
second, as an end for the pursuit of the good, that is, as a value contingent locus. 
Here the appeal is chiefly theoretical and conditioned by the analysis, since bridg-
ing these contingencies is the experience of morality in action. Consequently, as a 
metaethical “object” for ethical praxis, the individual capacity for moral behavior 
validates the acquisition of a wholly unique, value-laden referential status for the 
person. Kant, significantly, adopts a strikingly similar perspective, identifying the 
individual exclusively as an end and not as a means.
In Wojtyla’s theoretical exploration, the specific focus entails the phenomenal 
experience of subjectivity, that is, a cognitive and conscious dimension unique to 
each individual. His ethical analysis, accordingly, experientially and superficially, 
resembles ethical approaches that are phenomenologically and functionally driven. 
Unlike these approaches, however, Wojtyla explicitly views these as epistemological 
features only and so merely outward indicators of an inner and integral unity that 
he terms the “human suppositum,” that is, a metaphysical essence that is subjec-
tively constituted and phenomenologically manifested.
For ethical praxis this is significant for linking all dimensions of the individual 
to an integral reality that is phenomenologically expressed. In fact, the absence of 
such a unifying dynamic leaves ethical praxis inchoate, without either a contingent 
locus for value or a medium for its execution. Accordingly, the identification of the 
subject as a metaethical principle thereby extends value to the cognitive dynamics 
and physical organization of the neural architecture also. Indeed, it is on the basis 
of the integral unity of the individual that he later cautions in Veritatis Splendor [16] 
“against a manipulation of corporeity that would alter its human meaning.” For 
neuroethics, the utility of this metaphysical conclusion thus relates directly to the 
contribution of the nervous system to the unity of the person, that is, as a corporal 
manifestation that is enabling to a human ontological, subjective, and integrative 
order. In other words, by invoking the unity of the uniquely human subject, the 
metaphysical subject identifies in the neural operation a normative terrain.
3.2 The metaphysical subject as an ordering principle for the neural architecture
3.2.1 Integration and systemic operation
The reality of the metaphysical subject is evident through the objective mani-
festation of the phenomenal subject; that is, it is a reality apparent through epis-
temological inference. Importantly, the absence of direct empirical confirmation 
does not imply the absence of the subject’s reality, which can be seen in the variety 
of human functions that are nonetheless united in each individual. The subject’s 
epistemic appearance thus reveals the role of the metaphysical subject to be the 
physical realization of the integral and uniquely human subject.
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This role is apparent first in a unified organizational order that is operationally 
confined, which is to say that the metaphysical subject is seen through the reality 
of organismal integration. Its dynamic unity, for instance, is a fundamental feature 
shaped by evolutionary forces [17]. As one entity in an adaptive space, the organism 
constitutes a “unit of interaction” [18] where the whole organism is molded by evo-
lutionary pressures to acquire a suite of behavioral features maximizing its fitness.
The subject’s neural “manifestation,” accordingly, is not autonomously deter-
mined but is shaped by an extrinsic metaphysical order that is determinative for 
its expression. Indeed, it is generally recognized that material reality is subject to 
immaterial priors, for example, organizational principles. Recognition of these 
externally imposed orders can be seen in the need to invoke non-causal explananda 
in natural design, like the accounts used to explain the design of flagellar motors 
[19]. These immaterial determinants are even more apparent in the case of neural 
operation, where dynamic brain activity is necessarily linked to a system-wide 
network that subsumes regional activity to global performance [20].
Because such metaphysical determinants are only epistemically evident, how-
ever, empirically elucidating the physical mechanisms of integration becomes key 
to a principled neuroethical praxis. In consequence, praxis remains subject to both 
empirical and philosophy of science accounts for its evolution. For integration, the 
reconciliation of these accounts has been the subject of much debate. Although the 
reality of integration is evident in the natural world, its conceptual articulation 
through philosophy of science accounts has restricted the choice of hypotheti-
cal presuppositions used to define empirical resources. This has exposed current 
accounts of integration to factual inconsistencies and delayed the evolution of more 
realistic and comprehensive frameworks.
The somatic integrity thesis, for example, which has served as the conceptual plat-
form for clinical determinations of death, invokes a causal, brain-directed model of 
integration, through which the functioning of the body’s varied physiological systems 
is coordinated [21]. According to this understanding of integration, ethical practice 
is contingent on the empirical demonstration of an irreversible loss of the capacity to 
maintain cohesive and coordinative function, the causal origin of which is identified 
with the brain. Loss of brain function is therefore equated with loss of the capacity. 
This conception now constitutes the philosophical linchpin for what has become a 
global clinical praxis. Probative actions, in consequence, such as the removal of vital 
organs, are defined in reference to the loss of a single organ, the brain.
Its validity, however, is challenged by a number of empirical observations 
following a diagnosis of brain failure, including continued heart and whole body 
circulation [22], wound healing, temperature regulation, and even pregnancies 
[23]. These apparent contraindications, claims of technological artifacts notwith-
standing, thus raise the issue of the nature of the brain’s relation to bodily processes 
and so how this relation impacts the physical conception of the death event.
The challenge to the somatic integrity thesis, in fact, retrieves a systemic notion 
of integration, where the source of integration is understood to be delocalized 
and distributed within and throughout the body rather than being confined to a 
single anatomical region. Such a conception of unity substantially differs from the 
strict causal notion of imposed control used to achieve an aggregate coordinative 
order. By siting its origin to a single organ within the individual, the latter notion 
has the conceptual and diagnostic effect of segregating the brain from the body’s 
remainder, physically, hierarchically, and functionally. Normatively, this division 
has created a chasm between the brain and body where the brain has acquired a 
valued status and the body’s remainder has been relegated to a dependency on 
the brain’s vital operation. The empirical contraindications thus evidence a form 
of integration that more closely resembles an integral unity shared equally by all 
7Introductory Chapter: Reconciling Neurobioethics through Nature’s Lens...
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.83502
material components and processes of the body, that is, a form of integration more 
closely corresponding with the metaphysical notion of unity invoked by Wojtyla. This 
altered conception has the important normative consequence of valuing the individual as 
a whole. Importantly, it reveals how the understanding of normative value is itself 
influenced by the epistemic order of the material body.
Considerable neuroscientific evidence favoring a systemic model of bodily inte-
gration has in fact now been gathered, particularly with regard to motor dynamics. 
Existing studies reveal, for instance, that peripheral and central nervous system 
activities mutually and reciprocally contribute to integration at multiple levels. 
These largely plastic influences have been shown to be progressively and hierar-
chically scaled within the nervous system to (1) shape inward and outward flow 
between the brain and body, (2) generate stable representations of bodily interac-
tion with the world, and (3) yield a dynamic, bodily integrated performance unit.
These studies underscore the unity of the body by showing that bodily sensory 
input molds connectivity patterns in the brain to shape the brain’s responses to 
afferent input, that is, the body is responsible for configuring the brain’s reaction 
to sensory information; the functional outcome of this molding is to modulate the 
brain’s “perception” of the world as a function of the body [24], that is, to unify 
bodily responses to external events with respect to the whole individual.
The generation of the bodily percept appears to unify the body for perfor-
mance [25]; that is, the percept is generated to unify action as originating from 
a single source. Accordingly, the dynamic nature of this process precludes the 
functional segregation of the events of the body from those of the brain. The 
need to achieve unity in performance, accordingly, implies that the perception 
of the world through the body requires the integration that is effected by the 
dynamical and reciprocal relations between the body and brain, that is, a delocal-
ized source of unity, which relates the body to the world and which is fundamental 
to its interaction with it.
3.3 The metaphysical subject and higher-order properties
Nonetheless, the delocalization that distinctively characterizes systemic forms leaves 
unexplained the presence of goal-directed behavior that is essential to autonomous 
living and the relation of such behavior to the mediation of systemic unity. Notions of 
integration premised on a systemic model, notably, fail to account for higher order 
(i.e., organismal and not merely cellular and organic, organizational, and behav-
ioral) properties constitutive of multicellular organisms generally and of humans 
with highly evolved nervous systems, in particular. This is also to say that while 
systemic models are consonant with the holistic character of living organisms [19], 
they do not account for autonomous behavior [26] and so are unable to account for 
a material realization of ontology. Such an explanation is crucial for neurobioethics 
in order to identify an empirically salient source of material processes undergird-
ing ontology and structuring a systemic model of integration. The account for the 
“emergence” of ontology in fact is likely to conciliate with intrinsic metaphysi-
cal features of natural reality, like the relational and communicative features 
described by Etienne Gilson [15], that is, these intrinsic features are fundamental 
determinants for the ontological form that is generated. In particular, they yield the 
most advanced expression of physical reality, the subjective entity, which, accordingly, 
is constituted as a metaphysical reality, as noted by Wojtyla. Indeed, neuroscientific 
evidence on the phenomenal subject is consonant with a role for their metaphysical 
evocation.
Critically, empirical studies indicate that higher-order properties emerge from 
the corpus as a whole and that these properties implement organismal integration, 
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here understood as an outcome of intentional, goal-oriented behavior. Accordingly, 
the integral unity of the individual is directly attributed to the autonomy of the 
intentional subject. Drawing from Mossio and Moreno’s theoretical account of 
organismal autonomy, notably, human ontological faculties share a profound 
intimacy with the body [27] both mediating bodily integration [28, 29] and sustain-
ing life. As predicable properties of the whole, that is, emerging for the “good of the 
whole organism” [17], such properties are intimately linked to processes both influ-
encing and influenced by its extended organizational form, and so are manifest in 
the mutually constraining influences of the peripheral and central nervous system. 
In other words, higher-order properties emerge from the body as a whole where they 
unify the body through intended global actions, including self-identity, agency, and 
consciousness, and so mediate a delocalized, systemic mode of integration.
The need for the emergence of these properties from the body can be seen in 
the case of self-identity and understood as an ability to differentiate the physical 
breadth that is subsumed by processes belonging to itself from those of the con-
tiguous environment. An organism like Caenorhabditis elegans, for example, must 
identify this range through the dynamical operation of its neural architecture [30], 
which regulates individual motor movements in reference to this global activity. 
In humans this perception of self has also been shown to be a process arising from 
afferent, somatotopic input of the whole body [27]; indeed, in the body’s absence, 
there would be no percept.
Similarly, the ability to initiate actions by oneself requires that these be stably linked 
to the self-percept [25] now known to entail a neural dynamic termed the motor image 
[31]. As currently understood the motor image constitutes a covert action undertaken 
only mentally and as a simulation of a non-executed action. That is, the motor image 
contains the feature elements of a motor trajectory and so contains the projected series 
of motions that are prospective for execution. Insights drawn from the motor image 
reveal that bodily representation is a key feature that frames the elements of the plan 
as teleologically oriented, that is, one that inscribes actions linking an agent with an 
objective destination. So inscribed, actions are thereby executed as a coherent and coor-
dinated dynamical ensemble, which have a causal origin linked to the whole individual. 
Accordingly, features of the motor plan entail mutual though distinct contributions 
from peripheral as well as central origins, underscoring the essential unity of dynamic 
performance even in its covert formulation, and directing it toward a unique goal.
Consciousness, likewise situates as a global property enable both responsible 
action and the execution of higher faculties. Current insights suggest a decentralized 
physical origin [32], where the body contributes to the emergence of consciousness 
in at least two ways, by (1) creating a generalized platform that sustains a phenom-
enological background of mental awareness and (2) stimulating its focal emergence. 
Together these results argue for a complex but nonetheless shared participation of 
brain and body in eliciting and sustaining all higher order properties, that is, a unified 
and delocalized source of bodily emergence.
4.  The advancing future: prospects for neurobioethics from a 
metaphysics of subjectivity
As noted, for Wojtyła, it is the dimension of metaphysics that situates the ethics 
of the personalist subject, where the person “constitutes a privileged locus for 
the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical inquiry.” In the Wojtyłan 
formulation, the normative value of the personalist subject thus emerges from its 
metaphysical and immaterial mooring, constituting the ground for its physical 
instantiation and the essential metaethical dimension for neuroethical praxis. 
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Accordingly, it grounds his claim against “dehumanizing” corporal intervention. 
In doing so it has a direct bearing on the construction of ethical standards that are 
probative, that is, the construction of normative statements that pertain to action-
able standards that would or would not infringe on a specifically human meaning.
By contrast, prevailing models of the subject that are a legacy of Cartesian meta-
physics, challenge, the specifically human meaning of the personalist subject that 
flows from his ontological primacy in the order of being. It is a challenge, moreover, 
also directed to the understanding of material reality. As Gillett has pointed out 
[33], what is evident in current debates over the nature of material reality is the 
extent to which the Cartesian segregation of immaterial and material dimensions 
and the invocation of a strictly causal model of relations suffice for ontic adequacy, 
that is, whether materialism alone or dualism offer adequate explananda to account 
for the material order. The debate on physical reality has significant repercussions 
in the ethical sphere, with normative consequences that impact neuroethical praxis 
and leads, increasingly, to dehumanizing tendencies.
How metaphysics grounds ethical praxis, accordingly, is a critical dimen-
sion often ignored in debates about human nature and its modification that are 
exacerbated by the advent of neuro and genetic technologies. The culmination of 
a multistaged metaphysical divorce has transpired since Descartes; however, its cur-
rent understanding has left efficient causal and mechanistic commitments to drive 
the prevailing materialism of modern neuroscience, leaving a decompositional and 
reductive philosophy to determine how brain operation is interpreted for the fore-
seeable future. Presuppositions invoked by these efforts belie the consilience with neu-
roscience that is more evident in Wojtyła’s proposal. Crucially, the need to account for 
the emergence of subjectivity from the material order, that is, the hallmark of the 
neural architecture, is left unexplained by the Cartesian metaphysical segregation. 
The ferment in current efforts to explain the reality of the brain and mind, however, 
indicates that modern metaphysical presuppositions that undergird neuroethics are 
in a process of flux. The current uncertainty surrounding the metaphysical status of 
subjectivity, therefore, suggests that the Wojtyłan metaphysical subject may open 
a new window on the objective reality of the subjective mind that will offer surer 
philosophical ground for neurobioethics.
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